This blog presents Metropolitan Engineering Consulting & Forensics (MEC&F) claim management and claim investigation analyses of some of the typical claims we handle

Sunday, September 8, 2019

Speeding drunk country musician Kylie Rae Harris, 30, kills herself and Maria Elena Cruz, a Taos High School sophomore, 16.

The dead speeding drunk driver, Kylie Rae Harris, 30

New details are emerging about the tragic accident that claimed the lives of singer-songwriter, Kylie Rae Harris, and a 16-year-old girl. Taos County Sheriff Jerry Hogrefe confirms to Yahoo Entertainment that Harris, 30, is considered to be responsible for the fatal three-car collision. (The third driver was unharmed.) Maria Elena Cruz, a Taos High School sophomore, has been identified as the teenager killed.

"At this time I will say with most certainty that Miss Cruz was an innocent victim of this senseless crash caused by Ms. Harris," Sheriff Hogrefe tells Yahoo Entertainment in a statement.

Speed appears to be a contributing factor in the collision while alcohol is suspected. Investigators are waiting on a toxicology report from the Office of the Medical Investigator. "As you know this is a non-chargeable case due to death of the at fault person (Harris) so the toxicology report is likely to be several months up to a year because of no urgency for criminal charges," Sheriff Hogrefe notes.

Sheriff Hogrefe told local paper Taos News that evidence at the crash scene indicated alcohol may have been involved, though he declined to provide specifics. Harris had a prior DWI conviction in Collin County, Tex. in 2017, according to the paper. Records showed that Harris had been court ordered to install an ignition interlock device on her vehicle.

Harris’s mother Betsy Cowan told People that alcohol was something her daughter “struggled with on-and-off over the years.” She didn’t want to get into specifics “out of respect to both families.” Alcohol, speed suspected in fatal crash involving Kylie Rae Harris. (Photo: Instagram)

The Sheriff’s Office says the musician was driving south on State Road 522 toward Taos, N.M. in a 2017 black Chevrolet Equinox when she clipped the back of a black Chevrolet Avalanche. Harris’s vehicle was launched into the northbound lane, causing a head on collision with a white 2008 Jeep driven by Cruz. Both of them died at the scene.

Taos residents are in mourning as the Cruz family is a beloved member of the community. Maria Cruz's father, Deputy Chief Pedro Cruz, is a Taos County Firefighter and EMT.

"This is truly a terrible tragedy that has affected all parties involved. There are no words that can express how much this tragedy has affected the family of Maria Elena as well as the community. At this time we are asking for privacy for the family," Taos County fire manager Mike Cordova told People. The department is accepting donations for the family at the Taos County Fire and EMS office. A funeral will be held on Sept. 10.

"Maria was a loving and caring person who was taken from her family and friends’ way too soon," her obituary reads. "She will be deeply missed by all who knew and loved her."

Harris's publicist confirmed news of the musician’s passing on Thursday. "Everyone that knew Kylie knew how much she loved her family and, beyond that, how much she loved music," the statement said. "The best tribute to her unmatched enthusiasm for both is to spread as much love as you can today, and listen to music that fully inspires you."

Harris, whose self-titled EP was released in March, is survived by her 6-year-old daughter.


Kylie Rae Harris, a country singer from Texas, has passed away after a three-vehicle crash in northern New Mexico. She was 30.

Harris, who was set to perform at the Big Barn Dance Music Festival in Taos on Thursday, was killed Wednesday night in the crash on State Road 522. Authorities say two people are dead, including a 16-year-old girl. The third driver escaped injury, the Associated Press reports. Alcohol is suspected as being a factor in the crash, according to the Sheriff's Office.

"We are heartbroken to confirm that Kylie Rae Harris passed away in a car accident last night," a publicist for the singer said in a statement to Billboard. "We have no further details to share, and ask for privacy for her family at this time. Everyone that knew Kylie knew how much she loved her family and, beyond that, how much she loved music. The best tribute to her unmatched enthusiasm for both is to spread as much love as you can today, and listen to music that fully inspires you."

Monday, August 12, 2019

Drunk and speeding NYPD officer Kimberly Lajara, 24,kills herself and her passenger,Oscar Monegro, 32, when she crashes her speeding white 2016 Mercedes car into a defenseless tree along the Henry Hudson Parkway in Manhattan and catches fire.

The speeding drunk NYPD officer Kimberly Lajara.  She also killed her passenger in the fiery crash.

Off-Duty NYPD Officer, Passenger Killed in Fiery NYC Car Crash
Their car crashed into a tree along the parkway, near West 96th Street, just before 3:45 a.m. Sunday, according to police
By Ken Buffa and Marc Santia

August 12, 2019

An off-duty NYPD officer and another person died when their speeding car crashed into a tree along the Henry Hudson Parkway in Manhattan, police and sources said.

The 2016 Mercedes Benz crashed into a tree along the parkway, near West 96th Street, just before 3:45 a.m. Sunday, according to police. The car was consumed by fire.

Officer Kimberly Lajara, 24, and her passenger, Oscar Monegro, 32, were pronounced dead after the crash, the sources and the NYPD said.Police say Lajara was a member of the 121st Precinct in Staten Island.

Officers were diverting traffic near the site of the crash hours later.

Most of the deadly drunk-driver (drug-related crashes) occur in the early am hours, like in this case. These drunks cannot drive in a straight line or follow the road and they end up crashing their cars.

Mayor Bill de Blasio tweeted, "We're mourning the loss of one of New York's Finest today."We disagree:she was a drunk loser who killed an innocent passenger.Besides, at 24 years old, how she could have made herself such a fine officer?

Police say an investigation is ongoing.



A young NYPD cop was killed in a fiery car crash along with her passenger early Sunday on the Upper West Side, possibly as a result of speeding, according to authorities and law-enforcement sources.

Officer Kimberly Lajara was flying south along the Henry Hudson Parkway around 3:45 a.m. when her 2016 Mercedes Benz hopped a median near West 98th Street and slammed into a tree, cops and sources said.

The Benz burst into flames, leaving both the 24-year-old Staten Island cop and her male passenger, Oscar Monegro, 32, dead at the scene, according to police.

The flames were so fierce that the two were “pretty badly burned” and “unrecognizable” at first, police sources said.

Investigators traced the car back to Lajara because the car was registered in her name, and her purse was found among its charred shell.

“Rest In Peace Police Officer Lajara,” tweeted Staten Island’s 121st Precinct, for which she worked. “You will be missed by your entire 121 Precinct Family.”

The cause of the crash officially remains under investigation, but sources said that it appears Lajara was speeding when she lost control.

The mangled mess of twisted metal left behind in the aftermath left onlookers horrified.

“I’ve never seen anything like that in my freaking life — a car mangled like that, destroyed,” said Paul Vella, 57. “It’s unbelievable. … It’s sad.”  

Additional reporting by Aaron Feis

Tuesday, August 6, 2019

FEDERAL COMPLAINT AGAINST PASSAIC COUNTY DEPUTIES RONALD LUCAS, VICTOR D’AGOSTINO, AND OTHERS for fabrication of evidence, conspiracy to prosecute maliciously, malicious prosecution, illegal arrest and imprisonment, etc.

COMPLAINT AGAINST PASSAIC COUNTY DEPUTIES RONALDLUCAS, VICTOR D’AGOSTINO, AND OTHERS for fabrication of evidence, conspiracy toprosecute maliciously, malicious prosecution, illegal arrest and imprisonment,etc.
Federal criminal civil rightslaw prohibits law enforcement agents from conspiring to interfere withfederally protected rights, depriving rights under color of law, or using orconspiring to use force, or threat of force, to interfere with the freeexercise of your civil rights.
To report criminal activitiesthat constitute violations of civil rights, contact:

U.S.Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Criminal Section, PHB
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 514-3204
Fax: (202) 514-8336
If you have a complaint ofpolice brutality or the abuse of your rights by the police or other publicofficials, contact the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI), listed in the front of your telephone directory under “police,” or writeto the Department of Justice at the address above.
An individual who believesthat a law enforcement agency receiving Department of Justice assistance, suchas a police or sheriff’s department, jail, state police, or corrections system,is discriminating on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex,or age may file a complaint with:

U.S.Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Coordination and Review Section
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 307-2222
TTY: (202) 307-2678
Fax: (202) 307-0595
U.S.Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Office for Civil Rights
810 Seventh Street, NW, Room 8124
Washington, DC 20531
(202) 307-0690
TTY: (202) 307-2027
Fax: (202) 616-9865
This is a complaint for Civil Rights violations (wrongfularrest, imprisonment, malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, etc.)against Passaic County sheriff deputies Ronald A. Lucas and Victor D’Agostino.

On February 4, 2019, ABergen County jury of my peers has found me not guilty of all the fabricatedcharges by Ronald A. Lucas, Victor D’Agostino that somehow I had pointed a gunat the officers on June 28, 2011 and that I was possessing a gun for an unlawfulpurpose and for hindering apprehension.  This was a not-guilty verdict onall four (4) very serious charges on the fraudulently obtained indictment inSeptember 2011. 
These are very seriousallegations and I would like to file criminal charges against the officers andeveryone who assisted for covering up their fabrications for the last eightyears.
During their January 29,2019 testimony (both direct and cross) Lucas and D’Agostino made a verysignificant number of additional contradicting and uncorroborated statements;this led to the non-guilty verdict.
Importantly, the sheriffofficers testified under oath that they failed to “knock and announce” prior toperforming a search of my home.
The numerous contradictingstatements of the sheriff officers provide further proofs that they fabricatedtheir charges against Dr. Stephanatos.

On January 23, 2019, as partof the pre-trial discovery, the Passaic County prosecutor, Mr. StephenBollenbach, provided me with several handwritten pages prepared by DefendantRobert Del Vecchio in May 2011.  The newly discovered pages show thatDefendant Del Vecchio faxed letters to the Passaic County Sheriff stating thatStephanatos was a “dangerous Deft” and that Stephanatos had threatenedhim on May 24, 2011.  All these written statements by Defendant DelVecchio were fabricated by him to prejudice the Passaic County Sheriff againstStephanatos and to force Stephanatos out of his home using the void ab initioex-parte writ of possession.
Judge Guida, the presidingjudge over the criminal proceedings, ruled that Dr. Stephanatos did notthreatened conspirator Del Vecchio with any physical violence and he onlywarned Del Vecchio of legal action.

Very Truly Yours,

BasilisN. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD
Tel.: (201) 366-4588
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
The contents of this e-mail message and anyattachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may containconfidential and/or legally privileged information.  If you are theintended recipient, be aware that your use of any confidential or personalinformation may be restricted by state and federal privacy laws.  If youare not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has beenaddressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mailand then delete this message and any attachments from any computer.

I hereby certify under penalty ofperjury that the foregoing statements made by me are true and correct.  I am aware that if any of the foregoingstatements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. NJ Court Rule R. 1:4-4(b); 28 U.S.C.§1746.

DATE: February 12, 2019

Respectfully Submitted,

BasilisN. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD


This is the oldest case in the state of New Jerseyand originated with a tax sale certificate for about $800 purchased by AmericanTax Funding, LLC in 2005. 
Stephanatos was the victim of a criminal conspiracy byindividuals (such as Robert A. Del Vecchio, Jr., and many others including hislawyer father who was convicted of Sherman Act violations and was stripped offhis law license, see http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/enforcement/co_14_012.pdf)
and entities (such as American Tax Funding, LLC) who liedto the Mercer County and Passaic County and court law clerks (e.g., lied toActing Law Clerk Jennifer M. Perez) and hired the sheriff’s officers toillegally seize Defendant’s home/business in violation of state and federallaws; the conspiracy was uncovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)with assistance from the Defendant (See
  its existenceagainst the Defendant and thousands of New Jersey homeowners was determined andconfirmed by the federal judge Michael A. Shipp in the federal antitrust caseIN RE NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Master Docket No.3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB  (see
 and by theconviction of at least 15 individuals and entities in New Jersey, includingPassaic County, by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (See https://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2014/former-new-york-tax-liens-investment-company-executive-pleads-guilty-to-role-in-bid-rigging-scheme-at-municipal-tax-lien-auctions
Contrary to what the trial court said, the Antitrustviolations were not part of any civil court proceeding and the Third CircuitJudge Hochberg never addressed such claims. The trial court confused the“conspiracy under section 1983” claim that was part of the 2012 lawsuitconsidered by Judge Hochberg, with the current claim of Antitrust Conspiracyunder the Sherman Act.  These are twoseparate claims and have nothing to do with each other.  Judge Shipp never decided the Antitrustclaims against ATF, LLC and others until October 2014, so these antitrust conspiracyclaims were not part of the Defendant’s 2012 lawsuit.  Even more crucial, the federal judge did notaddress the Uniformity Clause violation claims, because they were not part ofthat lawsuit and even if they were, judge Hochberg could not have addressedstate claims because the judge found no federal civil right violations.
Defendant’s property was located at 687 Indian Road,Wayne, New Jersey and was purchased by the Defendant in 1994 for $240,000.  The assessed value (AV) was $237,000, using a0.5 ratio; this means that the fair market value (FMV) assigned by Wayne TaxAssessor was $475,000, more than 40 percent greater than the 1994 purchasevalue.  Thus, Wayne Township Tax Assessor knew as early as 1995of the true fair market value of Dr. Stephanatos and that the taxes levied ontohis property were illegal because they exceeded the 15 percent range allowedunder the Uniformity Clause provision of the state constitution (Article VIII,Section 1, paragraph 1(a)).
N.J.S.A.54:4-1 states the requirement that property beassessed and taxed annually at its "taxable value." N.J.S.A. 54:4-2.25 states that the "true value"standard is to be used in the assessment of taxable property. N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 specifically directs the assessor annually to determinethe "full and fair value" of real property by making an informedestimate of the price at which a particular parcel would sell for at a"fair and bona fide sale." That phrase, "full and bona fide sale,"is commonly understood as "market value."  Wayne Township failed to follow the above statutesand therefore the assessment was invalid.
Theproperty was damaged by flooding starting in about 2000 and later years due tothe flooding at Ramapo River that reduced significantly the propertyvalue.  Defendant proceeded on a prosebasis to attempt to reduce the taxes charged by the Wayne Township by using avariety of arguments, including Equal Protection, the Taking Clause, etc.  The Uniformity Clause provision of the NewJersey Constitution was not used as argument because at the time, Defendant wasnot aware that Wayne Township was using a 0.5 ratio between assessed value andtrue fair market value.  Almost allmunicipalities use a 1.0 ratio between assessed value and true fair marketvalue. 
Defendantfiled legal actions challenging the constitutionality of the taxes using equalprotection arguments.  He neverchallenged at the time the illegal overassessment because he was not aware ofthe use of the 0.5 ratio between AV and FMV. Defendant paid all taxes assessed from 1994 through 2004.  In 2004, the tax collector did not properlycredit the $800 state refund to the 2004 taxes, but instead credited them tothe 2005 taxes due.
Facedwith continued dispute with Wayne, Plaintiff paid about 50 percent or so of thetaxes starting with 2005 tax year.  Theissue of overassessment of his property was never addressed by any court, asDefendant was not aware of the 0.5 ratio. It is crucial to Defendant’s case to be allowed to explain to the jurythe background leading to the illegal eviction.
A complaint to foreclose tax sale certificate number 2310was filed on February 18, 2009. The tax sale certificate was sold by Waynetownship to American Tax Funding, LLC on September 27, 2005 for delinquentproperty taxes on property located at 687 Indian Road.  Defendant filed acontesting answer on April 1, 2009. On June 12, 2009 a motion for summaryjudgment was denied by Judge McVeigh and the foreclosure matter stayed for fourmonths to allow Defendant to file a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs inthe law division by June 19, 2009. This complaint was filed on June 16, 2009and ultimately dismissed on February 19, 2010 by Judge Riva.  Judge Riva dismissed the case after anunnoticed motion by Wayne Township.  Nohearing ever took place and no fact finding was ever conducted by JudgeRiva.  He never issued an application ofthe law to the facts in violation ofRule 1:7-4(a).  R. 4:64-6 states that in foreclosure oftax sale certificates, if the defendant'sanswer sets up the defense of the invalidity of the tax or other lien, or theinvalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the invalidity of the sale, thosequestions shall be tried in the action.  However,here there is neither fact finding nor a trial on any of the issues raised byDr. Stephanatos.
Defendant was not aware thatJudge Riva dismissed the action while still in discovery.  It was during the discovery period when theDefendant found out about the 0.5 ratio between AV and FMV used by the WayneAssessor. The issue of overassessment of the property was never submitted toJudge Riva because he retired shortly after.
On April 27, 2010 and order was entered by Judge McVeighstriking the answer and returning the matter to the Office of Foreclosurebecause she considered the matter uncontested.  She never issued an application of the law tothe facts in violation of Rule1:7-4(a).  However, Defendantcontinued to contest the validity of the tax and the tax sale certificate andalso indicated that ATF and Robert Del Vecchio were lying to the court(s). Acase is considered contested when the Defendant contests the validity of theunderlying lien or debt, which he did.  R. 4:64-6 states that in foreclosure of tax salecertificates, if the defendant's answer sets up the defenseof the invalidity of the tax or other lien, or the invalidity of theproceedings to sell, or the invalidity of the sale, those questions shall betried in the action.  However, here thereis neither fact finding nor a trial on any of the issues raised by Dr.Stephanatos.
Despite having nojurisdiction for contested cases, the Office of Foreclosure entered an ordersetting amount, time and place of redemption on January 14, 2011, fixing aredemption date of March 2, 2011. This is the time that Defendant became awareof what was going on.  He immediatelyfiled a motion to vacate the redemption order and asked for re-instatement ofthe claims against Wayne Township.
On March 21, 2011 an orderwas entered by Judge McVeigh denying Defendant’s motion to vacate theredemption order and further denying Defendant’s request to stay the matterpermitting reinstatement of claims against Wayne Township.  She never issued an application of the law tothe facts in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a). In fact, all other NewJersey court cases cited by the state were decided by motion, without anyhearing and without  anapplication of the law to the facts inviolation of Rules 1:7-4(a) and R. 4:64-6.Dr. Stephanatos has evidence that he was in fact a target of state and localgovernment employees because of his lawsuits against Wayne Township asking forEqual Protection.
Former Judge McVeighs orders were frivolous because equitycannot "create a remedy that is in violation of [the] law." IMO Estate of Shinn, 394 N.J. Super. 55, 67(App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 595 (2007). Rather, a decision isincorrect when the court overlooks "the maxim that 'equity follows the law.'"Id. at 67.  See also M&D Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div.) certif.denied, 180 N.J. 151 (2004) for its rationale that chancery courts "in such foreclosure cases should be alerted. . . that a significant windfall might result if adequate scrutiny . . . isnot undertaken[,]"
“We are of the view that particularlyin situations like the one involved in this case, where there is substitutedservice, as well as a tremendous disparity between the amount due on the taxcertificates and the value of the property subject to foreclosure (hereapproximately $4,500 versus potentially $100,000 to $200,000 for the property),careful scrutiny of the affidavit of inquiry requires the Chancery Judge todemand more than cursory inquiries or recitals not only as a matter of dueprocess, but also of fundamental fairness. See Bron v. Weintraub, supra (42N.J. at 93-96). The Chancery Judge in such foreclosure cases should be alertedwhen the face of the documentation indicates that a significant windfall mightresult if adequate scrutiny of the affidavit of inquiry is not undertaken. Inview of our decision, the operation of the tax sale law requires that theentire judgment must be vacated as void based upon equitable considerations.”
The order granted Defendantan additional thirty days to redeem the tax sale certificate. The outstandingtaxes were not redeemed because Defendant knew that the property wasimpermissibly over assessed in violation of the Uniformity Clauseprovision.  An ex-parte Final Judgment wasentered on May 13, 2011. An ex-parte Writ of Possession was entered on May 13,2011, although such writs must be entered 3 days after the entering of finaljudgments. Eviction took place on June 28, 2011. An order was entered by JudgeMcVeigh on June 30, 2011 denying Defendant’s motion to stay the writ andfurther denying a stay pending appeal. Defendant filed an appeal that was neveradjudicated because the Passaic County sheriff took possession of Defendant’sdwelling on June 28, 2011. 
Here, ATF, LLC/Wayne Township knowingly charged excessivetaxes  and 24 percent interest andpenalties and fees on top of these excessive and illegal taxes.  Thus, a tax dispute of less than $20K (theoverassessment amount) became $60K.  Dr.Stephanatos offered to pay the $20K overassessment amount, but refused to pay the$60K amount.  Then the antitrustconspirators confiscated his residential real estate property, along with hisbusiness, Metropolitan Environmental Services, PC.  ATF, LLC received a property valued at$475,000 for a small tax debt, while at the same time permanently damaging Dr.Stephanatos business located in the premises.
ThatPassaic County Chancery Court failed to address the legal issues presented toit, and through the fraud and lies perpetrated by Robert A. Del Vecchio and ATFand others, certified that all issues in this contested matter were addressed,when in fact none had been addressed, especially the 40% overassessment ofDefendant’s property.  Defendant assertsthat Judge McVeigh was poisoned by Robert Del Vecchio, Jr who told her thatDefendant had not paid taxes since 1993 (a false allegation) and that Defendanthad threatened him with physical violence (also a patently falseallegation).  Defendant’s fate was sealeddue to these people who committed fraud on the court.  It is Defendant’s position that Due to theFraud on the Court, no judge had jurisdiction over the F-9241-09 case and allorders, judgments, writs were VOID AB INITIO. It isalso clear and well-settled New Jersey law that any attempt to commit “fraudupon the court” vitiates the entireproceeding.  See,e.g., Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952).  Gilgallon v. Bond, 279 N.J. Super. 265, 267(App. Div. 1995).
The antitrust conspirators(Robert Del Vecchio, Esq.) falsely told the Passaic County sheriff that Dr.Stephanatos had threatened him with violence, which was a lie.  That way, at least four sheriff officers cameto Dr. Stephanatos’ residence armed with MI-16 assault rifles.  Two sheriff employees, Lucas and D’Agostino,claimed that they were assaulted by the Defendant on June 28, 2011.  Dr. Stephanatos vehemently denied theaccusations and provided numerous proofs that the charges were fabricated inorder to remove him out of his home. Defendantwas indicted in September 2011.  Theprosecutor refused to inform the grand jury that Dr. Stephanatos wanted totestify as a witness and dispute the allegations of the two sheriff employees.
Defendanthired Carl Herman for the grand jury and after that Miles Feinstein who hasbeen on the case until his departure due to illness in February 2018.  In 2012, Mr. Feinstein and John Saycanick,Esq. filed a Motion to Change Venue due to conflicts of interest with the statewitnesses.  The assigned Judge De laCarrera never addressed the Motion to Change Venue until late 2015. Due to thecase delays, the assignment Judge Ernest Caposela removed Judge De la Carrerafrom the case in May 2016.  After that,Judge Marilyn C. Clerk took over the case, but determined that the case wasimproperly kept in the Passaic Vicinage and should have been transferred toanother county due to the conflicts of interest and the appearance ofimproprieties.  The case was transferredto Judge James Guida in Bergen County for adjudication in January 2018.
BetweenNovember 2015 and May 9, 2018, Dr. Stephanatos submitted 33 OmnibusMotions to Dismiss, including supporting brief and attachments.  He alleged perjury on the part of the sheriffemployees and prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury, among othermotions.  Defendant provided clear proofsof perjury and misconduct and requested a hearing pursuant to State v. Atwood, 161 A.3d 763, 229 N.J. 255(2017).  Defendant also requested thatthe indictment be dismissed because theseven (7) year, 2,450-day case delay deprived the defendant of hisconstitutionally-guaranteed right to a speedy trial.
In May 24, 2018, erroneouslyrelying on a civil court case that was decided by motion, without any hearings,Judge Guida denied all the Omnibus Motions. He denied all defenses, including the claim of illegal overassessment ofDefendant’s property, unconstitutional taking of private property, duress, outrageousgovernment conduct, Castle Doctrine Defense (N.J.S. 2C:3-4 and N.J.S. 2C:3-6), due process clauseviolations under the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments to the U.S. Constitution.The Court also did not dismiss the indictment under the doctrine of cumulativeerrors; State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125,129 (1954). Very significant, the judge said that the Defendant willnot be allowed to bring the claim of illegal overassessment of his residentialproperty during the trial that has been scheduled for August 6, 2018.  This is extraordinarily damaging to theDefendant, as he will not be able to present the “totality of thecircumstances” to the jury that lead to the events of June 28, 2011, includingthe fraud-on-the-court claim.  Defendantsubmits that the exception to the collateral bar applies, because the FinalJudgment was transparently invalid, void, or frivolous order and/or requiredthe "irretrievable surrender" of constitutional rights or no“adequate and effective” opportunity for appellate review exists, because thejudgment issued by the Mercer Court was ex-parte, without any hearing ornotice.
On June 4, 2018, on a Motion for Reconsideration, JudgeGuida admitted that Mr. Feinstein only asked for 31 adjournments out of 75+total. He had initially stated on May 24, 2018, that Feinstein had asked for 80out of 100+ adjournments.
TheDefendant asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s decision denying hisdefenses and claims, including the violation of his fundamental speedy trialright. The Court should also allow the Defendant to present the propertyoverassessment claims, outrageous government conduct, duress, due processviolations, Article I, par. 20, N.J.Const. violations and other defenses to the jury.
A defendant has a fundamentalconstitutional right to a speedy trial.  U.S.Const., amend.VI; N.J. Const. Art. I, par. 10.  New Jersey has adopted the four-prong test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether a defendant’s right to aspeedy trial has been violated. See Statev. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976).
The United States SupremeCourt in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 101, 117 (1972), and the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), examined theconstitutional right to a speedy trial in the context of a criminal charge anda DWI charge, respectively. The New Jersey Supreme Court instructed, “[p]rompt disposition of criminal orquasi-criminal charges addresses the interest of the accused to be treatedfairly …and prevents prejudice to the accused.” Id. at 276.
Courts should assess “fournon-exclusive factors” to determine if a defendant’s constitutional speedytrial guarantees have been violated: length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right by a defendant,and prejudice to the defendantId. at 264.; see also State v. Farrell,320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1(App. Div. 2009).  United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d161, 174 (3d Cir. 2014).  The fourfactors in Barker are identical to the ones in Farell, supra: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for thedelay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice tothe defendant. See Cahill, supra, 213N.J. at 270. Due to the lack of a specified time period, courts must engagein a balancing process, subject to the specific facts and circumstances of eachcase.  Adetermination by a trial judge on whether defendant was deprived of right tospeedy trial should not be overturned unless "clearly erroneous." State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17(App. Div. 1977).
The Length of theDelay
The threshold question under Barker iswhether the length of delay was sufficient to trigger analysis of the remainingfactors. This involves “a double enquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505U.S. 647, 652 (1992). “In other words, a courtfirst decides whether the delay is long enough that it should trigger analysisof the other Barker factors. . . . If it is, the length of the delay isalso separately weighed in the court’s analysis of the remaining factors.” Velazquez,749 F.3d at 174 (citations omitted). The length of delay is measured“from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the startof trial.” United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hakeemv. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1993) at 760).“We have previously held that a delay of even fourteen months is sufficient totrigger review of the remaining Barker factors. Id. (citing Hakeem,990 F.2d at 760).
Stephanatos hasendured what is undeniably an “extraordinary delay” in awaiting trial.  Seven years have elapsed since he was detainedby the government on June 28, 2011, and he still has not had his trial day incourt.  Courts assessing Sixth Amendmentspeedy trial claims have consistently branded as “extraordinary,” “excessive,”“substantial” and “disturbing” multi-year delays between indictment and trial,weighing such delays heavily in the defendant’s favor in the Barker balancinganalysis.  See, e.g., Doggett, 505U.S. at 652, 655, 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 2693 (dismissing with prejudice, after finding aneight-and-one-half year delay between indictment and trial “extraordinary” and“excessive”); Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2193-94(dismissing with prejudice after finding “clear[ly] . . . extraordinary” anover five-year pre-trial delay); United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d at148 (dismissing with prejudice after deeming a34-month pre-trial delay “disturbing”); United States v. New BuffaloAmusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing with prejudice after ruling that apre-trial delay of “four and one-half years is unquestionably substantial”); UnitedStates v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing with prejudice after quoting trialcourt finding that “[f]ive years well exceeds a length of time that might beheld to be presumptively excessive”). Indeed, under the Barker analysis,delays of just one year are “presumptively prejudicial.” Doggett at 505U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1.
“There is no set length oftime that fixes the point at which delay is excessive.” State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.. Super. at 12.  In Cahill, the Court instructed that agauge to a “presumptively prejudicial” delay is “the amount of time customarilyrequired to dispose of similar charges.”  State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265. Here, this is an assault case that involves only one defendant.  It is not a complicated case and the state isnot performing further investigation into the facts of case.  In fact, the state had finished itsinvestigation in 2011.  It should havetaken no more than 2 years for the adjudication this case. In State v. Tsetsekas, the Court found that344 days, “more than five times the stated [Supreme Court] objective” …weighted heavily for the defense. Statev. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 11. Seealso United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d1413, 1417 (9th Cir.1986) (six-month delay is a “borderline case”).  See also United States v. Velazquez,749 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2014): Inweighing all the factors, we concluded that the [6.5 year] delay violated Velazquez’sconstitutional right to a speedy trial, and that dismissal of the indictmentwas required”. Id. at 186.
Here, there is a more than 2,450-day (81-month)delay since the indictment in September 2011 and most of the delays have beencaused by the failure of the judge(s) to timely rule on motions to change venue(it took 3 years to rule on that motion and only after continued inquiries bythe Defendant) and by at least 2 or 3 changes in the Passaic County prosecutorson the case (this caused an additional 2 years in delays attributed solely tothe state).  Thus, the case must be dismissed with prejudice.  These enormous delays arepresumptively prejudicial, considering that the defendant is a licensed expertwitness whose reputation has been tarnished by the charges and cannot earn aliving.  Even worse, the physical settingof the property where the alleged offense occurred has been drastically changedby the new owner of the property and the jurors will not be able to assess thetruthfulness of what the sheriff employees claim.  Judge Guida in his oral opinion referred tothis torturous delay as “almost unconscionable”.  Thisfactor weights very heavily in favor of the Defendant.
Assertion of Right
The Defendant first assertedhis right to speedy trial before Judge Filko and Judge Reddin in 2012.  He also continued to assert his speedy trialrights throughout the proceedings.  Inaddition, a defendant does not have an obligation to assert his right to aspeedy trial because he is under no obligation to bring himself to trial. Cahill,at 266. Court delays are chargedto the State, not to the Defendant. Statev. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 450-451. This factor weights in favor of the Defendant.
Reason for the Delay
The government bears the burden of justifying the delayin bringing a defendant to trial. Battis, 589 F.3d at 680 (citing Hakeem,990 F.2d at 770). “In evaluating this factor, we subtract the amount of delaycaused by the defendant from the delay caused by the Government.” Id. (citingUnited States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1998)). In Battis,we set forth the three categories of delay and the resulting weight eachcarries against the government: (1) “A deliberate effort by the Government todelay the trial in order to hamper the defense weighs heavily against thegovernment;” (2) “A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowdedcourts also weighs against the Government, though less heavily;” and (3) “avalid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriatedelay.” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Bycontrast, delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” Id. at680 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case has a very detailed record that explains thatmost of the delays have been caused by the government, and particularly thecourts in delaying the adjudication of the Motion to Change Venue.  It took 6.5 years for the courts to correctlydecide on that motion to change venue filed in early 2013.
There have been several judges assigned to this casesince 2011:

·        Judge Reddin (from October 2011 to November 2011)
·        Judge Filko (from November 2011 to March 2012)
·        Judge Yablonsky (from March 2012 to May 2012)
·        Judge de la Carrera (from mid-2012 to May 2016);
·        Judge Caposela (from May 2016 to September 2018,after removing Judge de la Carrera from the case for failing to timely rule onmotions);
·        Judge Clark (from September 2017 to December 2017)
·        Judge Guida (from February 2018 to present)

JudgeDe la Carrera never addressed the 2013 Motion to Change Venue until late 2015.It took the judge three years to decide a motion that only should take fewminutes to few days to decide.  Due tothe case delays caused by the judge, the assignment Judge Ernest Caposelaremoved Judge De la Carrera from the case in May 2016.  Therefore, these 3 years of delays areattributed to the state and not the Defendant. 
Afterthat, Judge Marilyn C. Clark took over the case, but determined that the casewas improperly kept in the Passaic Vicinage and should have been transferred toanother county due to the conflicts of interest and to avoid the appearance ofimproprieties. The case was transferred to Judge James Guida in Bergen Countyfor adjudication in January 2018.  So, wehave an additional 2 years of delays from the firing of Judge De la Carrera tothe transfer of the case to Judge Guida. The Defendant has nothing to do with these delays.  These additional 2 years of delays aresquarely the fault of the court(s).
InFebruary 2018, Judge Guida stated in his Chambers to Mr. Feinstein that all thedelays are attributed to the court(s) and not to the defense.  Judge Guida also repeated this statement inopen court that same day.  In a stunningreversal of that statement, Judge Guida stated on May 24, 2018 that the casedelays are attributed to the Defendant, when in fact Defendant has been askingfor a speedy trial since the hearing before Judge Filko in 2011 and was sent tojail for 64 days between March and May 2016, because he asked too many timesfor the judge(s) to expedite the case. On June 4, 2018, the trial court corrected the record to state that Mr.Feinstein that only asked for 31 adjournments and not the 80 adjournmentsassigned to him on May 24, 2018. Therefore, the majority (44+) adjournments were caused by the courts andnot the defendant. 
The government's negligenceor recklessness, which is the reason for the delay, weighs in Stephanatos’favor. ? See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92S.Ct. 2182 (the government's negligence should weigh less heavily indefendant's favor than does a deliberate delay, but “nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility forsuch circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant”).
A mere presence of courtbacklog or overcrowded case load is insufficient to justify delay byprosecution. United States v. Goeltz, 513 F. 2d 193, 197, (10th cir.1975) Here, Judge De la Carrera took almost 3 yearsto decide a Motion to Change Venue, instead of deciding it within 30 days orless- that is clear negligence or recklessness in performing his judicialduties. He was in fact removed from the case by the Assignment Judge ErnestCaposela due to such recklessness.   And even worse, he decided the motion tochange the venue incorrectly, due to the significant conflicts of interest andthe appearance of impropriety by having sheriff employees and a judge or twostill working at the Courthouse in Passaic County and being also witness forthe state- this is also evidence of negligence. These delays and squarely wrong decisions on the Motion to Change Venue,cannot possibly be attributed to the Defendant; yet Judge Guida indicated thatall the delays are attributed to the defendant! This is a 180-degree reversal of what Judge Guida said in the February8, 2018 hearing when he stated that “thedelays are not attributed to the defense or the prosecution, but they areattributed to us [the judiciary]”. 
To the extent that theDefendant's counsel waived time or requested continuances, this would not beattributed to Defendant, due to counsel's actions contradicting the bestinterest of Defendant.  Regardless ofDefendant being bound by counsel's actions, defense continuances don't excuselengthy delays in the disposition of a case. United States v. Lam, 251 F. 3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).  
Defense attorneyscannot unilaterally continue cases. Continuances can only be accomplished withthe agreement of the prosecution or the court.
Even more important, thedefense continuances that Judge Guida cited were in fact approved by theprosecutor(s) and the court.  If the prosecutorsor the court had any problem with the continuances, they should have objected;but they did not – they went along with them. Judge Guida made a huge, enormous, gigantically enormous crucial errorin assigning the delay caused by continuances to the Defendant.  It was all on the Judge(s) and the prosecutorwho agreed to those continuances.  Thereis no record that shows that Defendant signed off on any continuance.
It is important to note thaton May 24, 2018, Judge Guida claimed that Miles Feinstein applied for 80 continuancesout of a total of more than 100. However, upon reconsideration, the trial court admitted that Mr.Feinstein only applied for 31 continuances, out of a total of 75.  Yet, Judge Guida failed to reverse his orderdenying the dismissal of the indictment; this a clear abuse of discretion.  The judge claimed that he had a special orderfrom the Chief Justice to bring the case to trial.  Defendant is speechless, as the Chief Justicecannot possibly ordered Judge Guida to violate the speedy trial rights of theDefendant.
Defense attorneys andDefendant have no power.  Defense counselcan only react to the system that the courts and the prosecution haveconsciously devised or that has evolved over the decades.  It was squarely the responsibility of the judgeand the prosecutor to prevent the 7-year delay in the case and not that ofMiles Feinstein or the Defendant.
The record shows that theDefendant continued to send letters to Judge De la Carrera and, when he wasremoved from the case, to Judge Ernest Caposela, asking for his speedy trialrights.  After De la Carrera was removedfrom the case in May 2016 by Judge Caposela (I was told that this was a trulyremarkable and unprecedented event in the history of the Passaic County court),it has taken another two (2) years to reach the point we are now.  And only because Defendant continued toinquire with Judge Caposela regarding the adjudication of the case on a speedybasis.
In addition to thatcorrespondence, the defendant has been asking his former lawyer Mr. MilesFeinstein, Esq. on a weekly basis to move forward with the case on a speedybasis and to inform the Court that the defendant wanted to exercise his speedytrial rights.  Therefore, this balancingfactor weighs in defendant’s favor, because Defendant was not the reason forthe delays.
The trial court alsoconveniently ignored the crucial fact that the former prosecutor on the case,Peter Roby was removed from the case in June 2016 and a new prosecutor wasassigned (Mr. Nubar Kasaryan).  After oneto two years, a new prosecutor was assigned to the case (Mr. StephenBollenbach).  Thus, the trial court’sstatement that the state prosecutors did not cause any delays and was alwaysready to proceed with the trial, is clearly erroneous.  Equally important, the state has not compliedwith the discovery requests of the Defendant.
On November 6, 2017, afterhaving been assigned the case from Judge Caposela, Judge Marilyn C. Clarkindicated that the case will be transferred to Bergen County Courthouse foradjudication due to the conflicts of interest that were described inDefendant’s 2012 Motion to Change Venue. Judge Clark and Judge Caposela were dumbfounded as to why the case wasnot transferred at the time (2012) to another county due to the significantconflicts of interest, involving at least 5 or so sheriff employees stillworking at the Passaic County Courthouse who would be witnesses for the state;and the former Chancery Court Judge McVeigh would also be a witness for thestate.  Then, in late December 2017, afteranother request by the Defendant to expedite the case, the presiding JudgeMarilyn Clark transferred the case to Bergen County (the case transfer orderwas signed by Judge Caposela).
Based on these facts, theDefendant has done everything humanely possible to expedite the adjudication ofthe case.  All these case transfer delayswere caused by the state judiciary in wrongly deciding the Motion to ChangeVenue and are squarely attributed to the State. Court delays are charged to theState, not to the Defendant. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 450-451.  Yet, Judge Guida attributed the delays tothe Defendant!  This is an extraordinaryerror committed by the trial court, requiring reversal.
I report below a state casewhere the charges were dismissed because the state failed to provide discoveryto the defendant for 531 days (about 1.45 years).  Here, we did not have complete discoverydespite the passing of seven years since the events of June 28, 2011. The Appealscourt reasoned that the defendant's speedy trial rights were violated eventhough the defense attorney wasn't "energeticin his demands" for discovery. StateV. Downs, Docket No. A-0, N.J. Superior Court, Appellate Div., February 14,2014.
See also the April 2014letter to Judge De la Carrera where he stated:
Thus, my concern is that if it takesmore than a year to rule on a motion to change venue, how long will it take toadjudicate the 25+ motions we haveput together for dismissal of the tainted and/or fraudulently procuredindictment?  I have sufferedsignificant economic and non-economic damages and I continue to suffersignificant economic and non-economic damages every day this case isdelayed.   I am urging this Court to read these documents into the record,including my concerns with all the delays in proceeding with the motions. 
Source:Letter from the Defendant to Judge De laCarrera, dated April 21, 2014.
ThisCourt also stated that the Defendant should have fired his lawyer.  But Defendant did just that many times, as isevidenced in the October 12, 2015 letter to Judge de la Carrera, entitled, “TheDecision to Remove Mr. Feinstein from the Case”..  Here is an excerpt from that letter:
For the last 4 years Mr. Feinstein hasbeen giving me one excuse after the other, delaying the adjudication of thecase.  Upon my numerous inquiries andcomplaints about these unacceptable delays, he did blame this court for thecase delays; he suggested that we file a complaint or ask for thedisqualification of this court for failing to rule on a simple motion to changevenue over a period of 3 years. 
Source:Defendant’s letter to Judge De laCarrera, dated October 12, 2015.
Therefore, the AppellateCourt must realize the superhuman efforts of the Defendant to assert his speedytrial rights.  Despite this significanteffort, Judge Guida claimed that the overwhelming delays in this case werecaused by the Defendant!  This is verysignificant and highly prejudicial reversible error committed by Judge Guida,requiring reversal of that decision.  Thetrial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss the indictment.
In State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17(App. Div. 1977) the Appellate Division ruled that Adetermination by a trial judge on whether defendant was deprived of right tospeedy trial should not be overturned unless "clearly erroneous."   Here, the factual determinations by thetrial court are clearly erroneous, necessitating an overturning of thatdetermination.
In Cahill, the Court explained that the “minimization of anxiety attributable to unresolved charges” is oneof the interests the speedy trial right is designed to protect. Id. at 266. “A speedy trial violationcan be established without evidence of prejudice.” Id. at 274 (citing State v. Farrell, supra., 320 N.J. Super. at 446.The Cahill Court explained, “every unresolved case carries with it somemeasure of anxiety.” Id.  “This is particularly true when one of thesanctions [for DWI is] a license suspension.” Id.
The court instructed in State v. Farrell, “prejudice to a defendant resulting from delay is no longer confined toinability to defend on the merits.  Prejudicecan also be found from employment interruptions, public obloquy, anxietiesconcerning the continued and unresolved prosecution and the like.” State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 452.  Likewise, the Court in Tsetsekas recognized that “significantprejudice may also arise when the delay causes the loss of employment or otheropportunities, humiliation, the anxiety in awaiting disposition of the pendingcharges, the drain in finances incurred for payment of counsel or expertwitness fees and the other costs and inconveniences far in excess of what wouldhave been reasonable under more acceptable circumstances. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 13.
The fourth factor, prejudice, is presumed since theseven-year delay from arrest to trial is wholly chargeable to the government. See,e.g., United States v. Ingram, 446F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding in a case of a two-yearpost-indictment delay that the defendant “need not demonstrate actual prejudiceresulting from the delay” because “[t]he first three Barker factors allweigh heavily against the Government.”).
Here, the Defendant hassuffered a very significant prejudice because his lawyer on the case, Mr. MilesFeinstein, Esq. became severely ill and dropped out of the case on February 8,2018.  The Defendant has suffered a massiveblow to his ability to defend the case, because Mr. Feinstein is a great triallawyer and was intimately involved with the case since 2012.  This prejudice to the Defendant has beencaused solely by the extraordinary 81-month delay in the case.
Furthermore, Defendant hassuffered very significant losses of employment, as employers performedbackground checks and refused to hire defendant, even after they madeemployment offers.  In addition, defendant lost several professionallicenses due to the outstanding charges, leading to further economiclosses.  Defendant also has not been able to obtain state licenses(including the New Jersey Licensed Site Remediation Professional license) to doprofessional work because of the pending, unresolved charges.   Even worse, Defendant was scheduled to sit forthe California Bar exam in July 2011. Defendant lost also this ability to sit for the bar exam due to theevents of June 28, 2011.  Several NewJersey licensing boards even denied defendant the application to sit for exams,causing defendant to lose very significant business and/or employmentopportunities.  The net result of these prolonged delays is potentiallymulti-million dollars in economic damages, anxiety and enormous stress in boththe financial and personal life of the Defendant.
As a professional expertengineer, defendant has also suffered irreparable reputation loss thatessentially destroyed his career that he worked many decades to build.   These unresolved (not to mention fraudulent)charges have destroyed the Defendant economically and reputationaly.  Due to these losses and the continued andunresolved prosecution Defendant suffers from anxiety, humiliation andwithdrawal from social events.  Both hispersonal and professional life is essentially destroyed by the failedresolution of the pending wrongful charges.
As was also explained underthe section “The Reason for the Delay”,the long delay has already prejudiced the defendant because the landscaping atthe subject dwelling where Lucas was peering through the side window has beenchanged through the removal of the yews and rhododendrons and the big plantersand the pet tower.  Furthermore,defendant is prejudiced because he has been concerned that along with thebushes, the sheriff may have destroyed videotaped and audiotaped evidence thatis exculpatory to the defendant. 
Finally, but not least, my lawyer of 6 years on this case, Mr. MilesFeinstein, became very ill and had to drop out of the case in February2018.  This will most likely affect theability of the Defendant to defend these charges, as Mr. Feinstein was a great triallawyer. These are some very serious prejudices that hamper thedefendant’s defense and they are the sole creation of the state. Therefore, this factor also weighs heavilyin favor of the Defendant.
In a 180-degree reversal ofhis February 8, 2018 statement in Chambers to Mr. Miles Feinstein and in opencourt, Judge Guida erroneously attributed most of the 2,500-day (81-month)delay in the case to the Defendant by falsifying the continuance records; thisis unfathomed and goes against the factual record cited herein.  When Judge Guida was confronted with thecorrect evidence showing that Mr. Feinstein only adjourned the case 31 out of75 times, then Judge Guida changed his tune and said that he has a specialorder to bring the case to trial.  Thisis clearly erroneous.  Later, on June 13,2018 during a hearing after a Motion to Recuse based on Disqualification, JudgeGuida admitted that he had no special order from the Chief Justice to bring thecase to trial.
The factual determinationsmade by Judge Guida were in clear error and highly prejudicial, especiallyafter he failed to state that there has been already a change of severalprosecutors on the case, causing delays. The failure to dismiss the indictment is an abuse of discretion. Thefinding of no speedy trial right violation was a clear error.  All these errors and abuse of discretionrequire reversal.
In Carini, the Second Circuit charged to thegovernment various delays for reasons less egregious than here.  The Court found that the great bulk of a34-month delay was attributable to a judge’s illnesses, “the court’s summer recesses, unexplained inaction of the DistrictCourt, caused, no doubt, by an overloaded docket,” and the disqualificationand death of other judges. Carini, 562 F.2d at 149.  All of this delay was charged to thegovernment, although none of it was attributed to some improper governmentintent. Id.; see also New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d at377-80 (finding a four-and-one-half year delay --attributable to government inaction, over-crowded dockets, and “the trialcourt’s failure to rule expeditiously on appellants’ motions[]” -- warranteddismissal with prejudice).
 See also United States v. Pennick, 2ndCircuit, 16-3069-cr, Nov. 2017, wherethe District Court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the indictment withprejudice because 6.5 and almost 8 years had passed since they issued theirdecisions.  The Second Circuit said that “Althoughsome delay can be attributed to Pennick, such as delays arising from retainingfour different attorneys, some delay can also be attributed to the government,such as for twice superseding the indictment, and much of the delay can beattributed to the court, as it candidly acknowledged, such as the delay indeciding motions. ?While the government may have had little control over the?institutional delays? more appropriately attributable to the court, ?theultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the governmentrather than the defendant.??  cf.United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 2016) (commending thedistrict court?s ?honest and unequivocal acceptance of responsibility? for aSpeedy Trial Act violation, but noting that ?the mere fact that a speedy trialviolation is attributable to the court and not the government does not expungethat violation, nor does it automatically render the violation any lessserious.?).
Therefore, based on theabove factual and legal record, the Court has expressed its decision based upona palpably incorrect or irrational basis and against the vast number of similarcases from all federal circuit courts and courts of this state.  It is obvious that the trial court either didnot consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competentevidence.  Therefore, reversal of the trialcourt’s May 24, 2018 order is required to correct these extraordinary factualand legal errors committed by Judge Guida, necessitating the dismissal of theindictment.